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  1. Enable C++ applications for Web service using XML-RPC with Kart hik Subbian.
  2. Working on
  3. Migrating Microsoft Visual Studio C/C++ Project to Eclipse CDT with Priyadarshini Sampath, Karthik Subbian.


  1. Anonymous peer-to-peer networking with Rajaraman Hariharan
  2. Methods, systems, and computer program products for integrating legacy applications into a platform-independent environment with Rajaraman Hariharan
  3. Anonymous Peer-to-peer communications with Rajaraman Hariharan
  4. Integration of legacy applications with Rajaraman Hariharan, Priyadarshini Sampath

1.Incentive Compatible Mechanisms for Ticket Allocation in Groups for Software Maintenance Services ((To appear in Conference Proceedings of 14th Asia-Pacific Software Engineering Conference 2007 (APSEC) )

A customer reported problem (or Trouble Ticket) in software maintenance is typically solved by one or more maintenance engineers. The decision of allocation to one or more engineers is generally taken by the lead, based on customer delivery deadlines and technical complexities. The key challenge in such scenario is un-truthful (hiked up) elicitation of problem complexity by each engineer to the lead which results in a non-optimal allocation. Hence, in this paper we use game theory to examine the issue of truthful elicitation of ticket complexities by engineers for solving Ticket as a group (or Group Ticket Resolution) given a specific customer delivery deadline. We formulate a strategic form game and propose two mechanisms for this problem, Division of Labor (DOL) and Extended Second Price (ESP).We show that DOL ensures Individual Rationality (IR) and Bayesian Incentive Compatibility (BIC) for all players in the game. We also prove ESP ensures BIC, IR and Coalitional Rationality (CR). Finally we compare the total payments across these two mechanism using experiments.


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