Publications
1.Incentive
Compatible Mechanisms for Ticket Allocation in Groups for Software
Maintenance Services ((To appear in Conference Proceedings of 14th
Asia-Pacific Software Engineering Conference 2007 (APSEC) )
Abstract: A customer reported problem (or Trouble Ticket) in software
maintenance is typically solved by one or more maintenance engineers.
The decision of allocation to one or more engineers is generally taken
by the lead, based on customer delivery deadlines and technical
complexities. The key challenge in such scenario is un-truthful (hiked
up) elicitation of problem complexity by each engineer to the lead
which results in a non-optimal allocation. Hence, in this paper we use
game theory to examine the issue of truthful elicitation of ticket
complexities by engineers for solving Ticket as a group (or Group
Ticket Resolution) given a specific customer delivery deadline. We
formulate a strategic form game and propose two mechanisms for this
problem, Division of Labor (DOL) and Extended Second Price (ESP).We
show that DOL ensures Individual Rationality (IR) and Bayesian
Incentive Compatibility (BIC) for all players in the game. We also
prove ESP ensures BIC, IR and Coalitional Rationality (CR). Finally we
compare the total payments across these two mechanism using
experiments.